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ABSTRACT
The Federal Circuit's recent sua sponte grant of rehearing en banc in Knorr-Bremse v.
Dana Corporationhas catalyzed a vocal debate concerning the nature and consequences
of willful patent infringement. Subject to virtually unanimous condemnation is the
Federal Circuit's "adverse inference" rule, which forces a party accused of willful
infringement to choose between two unpalatable options: (i) disclosing privileged advice
of counsel to mount a willfulness defense, or (ii) not disclosing such information and
being subjected to an adverse inference that an exculpatory opinion was not or could not
be obtained. This commentary concurs that the adverse inference rule should be
abandoned, for its provenance is far from clear and the harm it works to attorney-client
privilege is substantial. More broadly, this commentary questions whether the notion of
willful infringement remains defensible in a patent system marked by significant
uncertainties as to the boundaries of literal claim scope and the doctrine of equivalents.
At a minimum, the question of willfulness should no longer be given to juries. The
analyses of willfulness and damages enhancement are inextricably bound together and
both should be decided by the courts. Practical benefits and policy considerations
support this proposal and Seventh Amendment concerns do not preclude it.
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The plethora of amicus curiae briefs filed in response to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit's September 26, 2003 sua sponte grant of rehearing
en banc in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.1
evidences a strong consensus that the current U.S. law of willful patent infringement
is badly in need of reform. 2 It is highly unlikely, however, that the Federal Circuit
will use Knorr-Bremse as a vehicle to completely obliterate the existing framework
for determining if an accused infringement was willful, and if so, whether the
patentee's actual damages should be enhanced under 35 U.S.C. § 284. Some form of
meaningful deterrent must be maintained as a check on those that would otherwise
knowingly and recklessly copy patented innovation. Rather, we can likely expect the
Federal Circuit to retain the "totality of the circumstances" analysis for determining
willfulness, 3 but (as the amici in Knorr-Bremsehave almost unanimously urged) 4 do
away with the adverse inference rule that currently follows from an accused willful
infringer's non-production of an exculpatory opinion of counsel.5 Many hope the court
" Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. The author welcomes
comments and questions via email to 7muellerijmls.edu. This commentary is based on remarks
presented by the author at the Symposium on Willful Patent Infringement co-sponsored by Oracle
Corporation and The George Washington University Law School, held March 19, 2004 in
Washington, D.C.
1 344 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 26, 2003) (order sua sponte granting rehearing en banc). The
Federal Circuit's order requested briefing from the parties on four questions:
1. When the attorney-client privilege and/or work product privilege is invoked by
a defendant in an infringement suit, is it appropriate for the trier of fact to draw
an adverse inference with respect to willful infringement?
2. When the defendant has not obtained legal advice, is it appropriate to draw an
adverse inference with respect to willful infringement?
3. If the court concludes that the law should be changed, and the adverse
inference withdrawn as applied to this case, what are the consequences for this
case?
4. Should the existence of a substantial defense to infringement be sufficient to
defeat liability for willful infringement even if no legal advice has been secured?
Id. at 1336-37. Amicus curiae were invited to file briefs addressing questions (1), (2) and (4). Id. at
1337.
2
A list of the amicus curiae briefs filed in Knorr-Bremse is available at
http://www.ssjr.com/amicusbriefs.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
3 See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that "[t]he
paramount determination in deciding to grant enhancement and the amount thereof is the
egregiousness of the defendant's conduct based on all the facts and circumstances"); id. at 827
(listing nine factors that courts appropriately have considered in determining whether damages
should be enhanced).
4 During the oral argument in Knorr-Bremse, Circuit Judge Lourie noted that 29 out of 30 of
the amici were in favor of eliminating the adverse inference.
Oral Argument before En Bane
Federal Circuit in Knorr-Bromse Systemo Fuer Nutzfahrzouge GmbH v. Dana Corp., Feb. 5, 2004
(audiocassette tape) (copy on file with author) (hereinafter "Oral Argument in Knorr-Bremsd').
5 In addition to the amici in Knorr-Bremse, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also proposes
a narrower willfulness doctrine. The FTC's October 2003 report recommends that "legislation be
enacted requiring either actual, written notice of infringement from the patentee or deliberate
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will go farther, by recognizing that an accused infringer establishes a complete
defense to willfulness by mounting a substantial good faith defense of invalidity,
unenforceability or noninfringement at the time of trial.
The following remarks address the notion of willfulness generally, the adverse
inference, and lastly, the question of who should decide willfulness-judge or jury.
Assuming that in Knorr-Bremse the en banc Federal Circuit retains the doctrine of
willful infringement in some form, I propose that the question of willfulness no longer
be given to juries. Rather, the determination of willfulness, like the enhancement of
damages that may result therefrom, should be made solely by the courts. Willfulness
and enhancement are inextricably bound together and both should be determined by
the trial court in the first instance. Practical benefits support this proposal and
Seventh Amendment concerns do not preclude it.

1. WILLFULNESS VEL NON

At the outset it is worth questioning whether our patent system should even
recognize a doctrine of willful infringement. As currently formulated by the Federal
Circuit, willfulness is a question of fact, based on the culpability of the accused
infringer's conduct. 6 Willfulness attempts to discern the infringer's state of mind or
bad intent.7 Older case law referred to it as "wanton" infringement, a slightly juicier
8
adjective if no more precise than "willful."
It is difficult and possibly misguided to deem particular accused activity
"culpable" when the current standards for "proper" behavior are so uncertain. For
example, one can reasonably question whether an accused infringer should ever be
deemed to have willfully infringed if the only successful theory of liability is under
the doctrine of equivalents. When liability is found under the doctrine of equivalents,
we are by definition going beyond the literal scope of the claims and reaching into a
judicially-created penumbra of the patentee's right to exclude. Can one ever willfully
violate a penumbral boundary?
The uncertainty problem seems especially exacerbated in the realm of
biotechnology, where we have a rapidly changing state of the art and a relatively
undeveloped body of Federal Circuit authority on how to measure infringement (the
classic function/way/result test for equivalency is ill-suited to substitutions of genetic
nucleotides and amino acids).9

copying of the patentee's invention, knowing it to be patented, as a predicate for willful
infringement." To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and
Policy, availableat http://www.fte.gov/os/2OO3/1O/innovationrpt.pdf at Ch. 5, p. 31 (last visited Mar.
25, 2004).
6 See Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (stating that "willful' [infringement] is quintessentially a question of fact, for it depends
on findings of culpable intent and deliberate or negligent wrongdoing").
7See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
8 See III William C. Robinson, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 1069 (1890)
(and cases cited therein).
9 Given the rapidly-changing state of the art, as well as a relatively undeveloped body of
Federal Circuit authority on how to measure infringement in the biotech context, biotechnology
patents are rarely surrounded by 'bright line' perimeters and certain validity." Brief of Amicus
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It is not even clear that one can be willful based on what is held in retrospect to
be literal infringement, of which claim interpretation is so often dispositive. The
latest figures show that for cases in which the Federal Circuit issued an opinion
during the year 2003, the Federal Circuit's reversal rate on claim interpretation was
53%. 10 If the federal district courts are getting literal claim scope wrong more than
half the time (according to the Federal Circuit), how can a factfinder ever conclude
with any certainty that an accused infringer "knowingly and recklessly" infringed?
One might argue that by maintaining the current willfulness doctrine based on
an accused infringer's culpability, the patent system provides a rough balance in
terms of advantage at trial with the accused infringer's defense of unenforceability
based on alleged inequitable conduct by the patent owner. Both sides get an equal
chance to paint the other as bad and deceptive. However, this balancing theory is
questionable. Inequitable conduct requires a showing that the patentee intentionally
deceived the PTO, violating the duty of candor in order to obtain a patent.11 The duty
of candor, including within it the duty of disclosure of known material prior art, is
fairly well defined and a necessary incident of running our ex parte system of patent
procurement without a meaningful opposition system as in Europe. There does not
appear to be an equally clear rationale for recognizing the doctrine of willful
infringement.
At the en banc oral argument in Knorr-Bremse, Circuit Judge Dyk asked why
we should not square up willfulness doctrine with the antitrust immunity that patent
owners enjoy when enforcing their patents. 12 As long as the infringement suit is not
a "sham" under the Profl Real Estate Investors standard 13 (or the patentee hasn't
engaged in Walker Process fraud4), the Federal Circuit will find the patentee
immune from an antitrust counterclaim under the Sherman Act § 2 based on the
enforcement of its statutorily-authorized monopoly. Why not establish a similarly
low threshold for avoiding willfulness - simply the accused infringer's assertion at
trial of a non-frivolous defense? One might argue (as Circuit Judge Clevenger did at
oral argument) that such a low standard essentially does away with willfulness
charges. I'm not sure that is a bad result, especially in view of the social costs of
recognizing willfulness that Professor Thomas Cotter has identified.1 5 It would also

Curiae Biotech Industry Organization in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmhH v.
Dana Corp., available athttp://www.ssjr.com/brief amicus4.pdf, at 12 (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
10See Timothy C. Meese, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It, But .. , in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 48H
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (The John Marshall

Law School, Feb. 27, 2004) (copy on file with author) (reporting that for a total of ninety-one
precedential and non-precedential decisions issued by the Federal Circuit in 2003, the trial court's
claim construction was reversed in forty-eight cases, resulting in a fifty-three percent reversal rate).
The Meese study does not include summary affirmances under Fed. Cir. R. 36.
11See generally Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (partially en banc).
12Oral Argument in Knorr-Bremse,supra note 4.
13 See Profl Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1991)
(discussing two-part definition of sham litigation).
14See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).
15 See Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of EnhancedDamages and Attorneys'Fees for
Willful

Patent Infringement, PROCEEDINGS

OF

THE

SYMPOSIUM

ON

WILLFUL

PATENT

INFRINGEMENT, at 2 (The George Washington University Law School, Mar. 19, 2004) (copy on file
with author) (contending that in many cases, the availability of enhanced damages based on
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follow that attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 would rarely be available based on
willfulness, but lowering willfulness standards would not exclude the possibility of
attorney fees based on the accused infringer's misconduct in the litigation process or
some other form of bad faith besides willfulness.
There is, of course, the valid argument that the patent system needs to maintain
the possibility of enhanced damages as a deterrent against infringement by those
who would otherwise be able to easily shield their piracy and remain undetected,
possibly never being caught. This deterrent rationale makes sense, but it still leaves
the threshold question of how to determine willfulness.
As Professor Cotter suggests, a finding of willfulness should have little to do
with the maliciousness of the accused. 16 Rather, a finding of willfulness is most
likely justified in instances where the infringement is likely to be difficult to detect,
as in cases when the infringer takes affirmative steps to hide its infringement.17 One
example is the infringement of process patents,1 8 although the recognized difficulty of
policing infringement of process patents is often cited as a reason that many firms
choose trade secret protection rather than patenting. Another example might be the
passing-off situation where the accused infringer marks its infringing product with
the patentee's patent number 19 (although we would expect those cases to be rare). In
order to determine willfulness, the factfinder would need to be informed about the
relative probability of detection of infringement.2 0 Another relevant fact might be the
length of time between the accused infringer's commencement of activity and the
patent owner's first detection thereof.

II. THE ADVERSE INFERENCE
A critical factor in the current regime for determining willfulness is whether the
accused infringer obtained a competent opinion of counsel prior to initiating its
activity. 21 Whether that opinion is produced in subsequent litigation is another
matter. Given the existing set of legal rules for willfulness, the accused infringer is
astride the horns of a dilemma. If she produces the opinion in the hopes of avoiding a
finding of willfulness, she has triggered a waiver of attorney-client privilege of
potentially devastating scope. On the other hand, if privilege is asserted and the
willfulness may give rise to undesirable social costs by "deterring marginally lawful behavior" and
by "deterring others from taking advantage of the disclosure afforded by the patent system").
16 Id. at 16-17.
17Id.at 16.
18 Id. at 19.
19 Id. at 20 n.100.
20 Id. at 16.
21 Although the absence of legal counsel's advice does not mandate a finding of willfulness, the
affirmative duty of an accused infringer having actual notice of another's patent rights normally
entails obtaining such advice. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Professor Moore's data affirm the criticality of an attorney opinion. Where willfulness was at issue,
accused infringers who did not produce an opinion of counsel were found willful over 80% of the
time. See Kimberly A. Moore, EmpiricalStatistics on Willful PatentInfringement,in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT, at 13 (The George Washington University

Law School, Mar. 19, 2004) (copy on file with author) (Table 1: "How Much Do Attorney Opinions
Impact Willfulness?").
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opinion is not produced, the trier of fact can draw the adverse inference that either
no opinion was obtained or that an opinion that was obtained was not exculpatory.22
I concur in the virtually unanimous rejection by the Knorr-Bremse amici of the
adverse inference currently being drawn from non-production of an opinion of
counsel. In addition to the obvious harm done to attorney-client privilege, the
provenance of the adverse inference is far from clear. The Federal Circuit announced
the adverse inference rule in Kloster Speedsteel (1986)23 and reaffirmed it in
Fromson (1988)24 without any citation to authority. The pre-1982 regional circuit
decisions on willfulness did establish the more general affirmative duty to proceed
with due care once an infringer has actual notice of another's patent rights. 25 But the
regional circuits never went so far as to recognize that that duty of due care
absolutely required obtaining an opinion of legal counsel, and certainly never held
that the failure to produce such opinion justified an adverse inference against the
defendant. Rather, the regional circuit cases held that the production of a competent
opinion letter was evidence going to the good faith of the accused. 26 Thus, in the preFederal Circuit world the opinion was a shield, not a sword.
Why then did the Federal Circuit transform a shield into a sword by creating the
adverse inference rule? Perhaps it was an attempt by the court in its early days to
shore up the respectability of patents, as Circuit Judge Newman suggested at the en
bane oral argument in Knorr-Bremse.27 A true cynic might be so bold as to suggest
that the Federal Circuit provided the burgeoning patent bar with a guaranteed
future demand for opinion-writing services. That certainly seems to have been the
28
affect of the adverse inference rule.
An adverse inference is blunt instrument, particularly in the context of jury
trials. Its use should be rare, rather than routine. Certainly if any such adverse
inference is retained by the Federal Circuit in Knorr-Bremse, it should be treated
only as an evidentiary presumption that can be completely rebutted by an accused
infringer's submission of other evidence of good faith sufficient to raise a genuine
22

See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

23 Id.
24
25

See Fromson v. Western Litho Plate, 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed.Cir. 1988).
See Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 666 (10th Cir.

1980).
26 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., 415 F.2d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 1969); Continental Can Co.
v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 362 F.2d 123, 129 (7th Cir. 1966).
27 Oral Argument in Knorr-Bremse,supra note 4.
28 Professor Cotter suggests that the adverse inference rule is "at least superficially consistent
with practices in other settings" of law, citing a criminal case in which the jury was instructed that
it could draw an adverse inference from a party's decision not to call a material witness, and another
case where the trier of fact was permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party's destruction of
evidence. See Cotter, supra note 15, at 7. During the en banc argument in Knorr-Bremse,a Federal
Circuit judge noted Supreme Court authority holding that an adverse inference can be drawn in a
civil case when a defendant invokes her Fifth Amendment right against compelled self
incrimination. See Oral Argument in Knorr-Bremse, supra note 4. But the case of Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), involved a disciplinary hearing for a prison inmate, where
important state interests other than criminal conviction were present. I am not sure that the
Federal Circuit's adverse inference rule can be defended on the basis of these non-patent cases,
which all seem rather quasi-criminal and did not involve assertions of attorney-client privilege as a
reason for not producing evidence.
These were not the "Hobson's Choice" situations frequently
confronted in patent cases involving allegations of willful infringement.
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issue of fact, as in the laches context. 29 The better outcome, however, would be a
complete elimination of the adverse inference rule.

III. WHO SHOULD DECIDE--JUDGE OR JURY?
This part of my commentary concerns the identity of the willfulness factfinder.
Assuming that in Knorr-Bremse the en banc Federal Circuit retains the doctrine of
willful infringement in some form, I propose that the question of willfulness no longer
be given to juries. Rather, the determination of willfulness, like the enhancement of
damages that may result therefrom, should be made solely by the courts. The fact of
willfulness and the enhancement of actual damages that can flow from willfulness
are inextricably bound together.
The question of judge versus jury is clearly of interest to the Federal Circuit as
indicated by the court's questions during the en banc argument in Knorr-Bremse.
However, the issue is outside the facts of Knorr-B-remse, which did not include a
Seventh Amendment issue, and was not included in the questions that the en banc
court set forth for briefing. It is therefore unlikely that the Federal Circuit will
change the law on this point in Knorr-Bremse. Nevertheless, it would not be
surprising for the court to express its views on the matter in dicta, as it has recently
done with respect to prosecution history estoppel in Festo.30

Such views might

motivate litigants in subsequent willfulness cases to squarely raise the issue on
appeal.
The question of judge-versus-jury for determining willfulness is an open one, for
the Federal Circuit has never clearly ruled on whether there is a Seventh
Amendment right to a jury determination on willfulness. The court was confronted
with the issue in 1995 in Transmatie, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., but was able to resolve
31
that case on alternative grounds without reaching the Constitutional issue.

I do not believe that the Seventh Amendment3 2 provides a right to a jury
determination of willfulness, for reasons similar to those set forth by the Supreme
Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 33 in which the court held that
claim interpretation is for the court, not the jury. Both the historical record and
"functional" or policy-based considerations support this conclusion.

29 See

Aukerman v. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en bane).
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (en banc) (initially stating that discussion of each of the three criteria for rebutting a Festo
presumption of complete estoppel "is best left to development on a case-by-case basis," but
proceeding to "provide . . . general guidance . . . regarding the application of the three rebuttal
criteria").
31 53 F.3d 1270, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
32 U.S. CONST., Amend. VII (providing that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
30

controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved").
33

517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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A. The HistoricalRecord
What does the historical record tell us about juror involvement in determination
of willfulness? It is clear that English juries were hearing patent infringement suits
as actions at law in 1791, when the Seventh Amendment was ratified.3 4 But what
those cases looked like, and what issues were at stake, is much less clear. Recall that
at the end of the 18th century, jury practice was in a "primitive state" and juries
35
were "still new to the field" of patent litigation generally.
Based on my research thus far, it is unlikely that English juries in 1791 were
being asked to determine first, whether there was infringement, and second, whether
that infringement was willful. The early English cases discussed by the Markman
Court do not suggest that the notion of willfulness even existed in 1791.36 For
example, in the famous case of Liardet v. Johnson, tried to a jury before Lord
Mansfield in 1778, the plaintiff had alleged that in addition to "making, using, and
putting into practice" the plaintiffs patented stucco composition, the defendant was
37
"counterfeiting, imitating and resembling" it,
which sounds like an allegation of
knowing copying and hence willful infringement. But Lord Mansfield's charge to the
jury merely said that to prevail, the plaintiff had to make out the ground that "the
defendant did use that which the plaintiff claims to be his invention." 38 No mention
was made of willful or wanton use.
The contemporaneous U.S. patent law did not speak of willfulness. The first
U.S. patent statute, the Patent Act of 1790, provided merely that an adjudged

3 See id. at 380.
5,Markman, 517 U.S. at 380.
36 Calthorp v. Waymans, 3 Keb. 710, 84 Eng. Rep. 966 (K.B. 1676) (an "action upon the case by
patentee ... against defendant for setting up and working another like [device]," but not mentioning
the notion of wanton or willful infringement), cited in Markman, 517 U.S. at 380; Dollond's Case, 1
Carp. P. C. 28 (C.P. 1758) (action for patent infringement, not mentioning willfulness), cited in
Markman, 517 U.S. at 380; Turner v. Winter, 1 T.R. 602, 99 Eng. Rep. 1274 (K.B. 1787) (involving
"an action on the case brought against the defendant for infringing the plaintiffs patent," but
making no mention of willful or wanton infringement), cited in Markman, 517 U.S. at 381;
Arkwright v. Nightingale, Dav. Pat. Cas. 37 (C.P. 1785) (action for patent infringement, not
mentioning willfulness), cited in Markman, 517 U.S. at 379; Bramah v. Hardcastle, 1 Carp. P. C.
168 (K.B. 1789) (action on the case for patent infringement, not mentioning willfulness), cited in
Markman, 517 U.S. at 377; Huddart v. Grimshaw, Dav. Pat. Cas. 265 (K.B. 1803) (action brought to
recover damages for the violation of a patent, not mentioning willfulness), cited in Markman, 517
U.S. at 379; Bovill v. Moore, Dav. Pat. Cas. 361, 362, 369 (C.P. 1816) (action for patent infringement
including allegations that defendant had "pirated" or "imitated" plaintiffs patent, but not
mentioning willfulness), cited in Markman, 517 U.S. at 382; Russell v. Cowley & Dixon, Webs. Pat.
Cas. 457 (Exch. 1834) (trial at law for patent infringement, not mentioning willfulness), cited in
Markman, 517 U.S. at 382; Haworth v. Hardcastle, Webs. Pat. Cas. 480, 482 (1834) (jury verdict
that "there has been an infringement of the [plaintiffs] patent," but not mentioning willfulness),
citedin Markman, 517 U.S. at 382.
37 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:
Antecedents (Part3), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 771, 795-96 (1995) (discussing facts of
Liardet v.Johnson and quoting historical accounts of same).
38 Id. at 796.
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infringer would pay the patentee "such damages as shall be assessed by a jury ....
39
which may be recovered in an Action on the Case founded on this Act."
The Patent Act of 1793 substantially changed damages assessment. Setting
forth a formula for the jury to compute a minimum floor amount of damages, the Act
provided that an infringer would "pay to the patentee a sum that shall be at least
equal to three times the price for which the patentee has usually sold or licensed, to
other persons, the use of the said invention, which may be recovered in an action on
the case founded on this act, in the Circuit Court of the United States, or any other
Court having competent jurisdiction." 40 There was no separate mention of any role
for the judge to enhance the jury amount. Edward Walterscheid has written that
the 1793 language was greatly influenced by Joseph Barnes, a publisher and
pamphleteer who was a sort of patent system gadfly. Barnes had "objected
strenuously to the idea of having a jury determine damages for patent infringement,
on the not unreasonable grounds that in many parts of the country a jury of the
41
infringer's peers would be most unlikely to award other than nominal damages."
By 1836, though, it seems that concerns had shifted in the opposite direction,
i.e., that juries were too much inclined to inflate damages in favor of the patentee in
order to punish the infringer. The Patent Act of 1836 is the first time we see the
concept of enhancement of actual damages, and that enhancement determination is
assigned exclusively to the judge. The 1836 Act provided that in any action for
damages for violation of patent rights where
a verdict shall be rendered for the plaintiff in such action, it shall be in the
power of the Court to render judgement for any sum above the amount
found by such verdict as the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, not
exceeding three times the amount thereof, according to the circumstances of
the case, with costs; and such damages may be recovered by action on the
case, in any Court of competent jurisdiction ....

42

Professor William Robinson's influential 1890 treatise on patent law confirms
the view that because juries were too easily swayed into inflating their verdict on
actual damages in order to punish an infringer, the decision to enhance damages in
cases of "wanton" infringement would be reserved exclusively for the judge:
In order to provide for cases in which a verdict for the actual damages
sustained would not afford complete redress to the plaintiff, the law
empowers the court to increase the award of the jury to an amount not
exceeding three times that fixed by the verdict. This is distinctively the
province of the court, and confers no authority upon the Jury, on any
ground, to transcend the limits of the actual damages which have been

'39Patent Act of 1790, § 4, reprintedin Edward C. Walterscheid, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS
OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836 (Rothman 1998)

(hereinafter "Walterscheid 1998"), at App. V.
40 Patent Act of 1793, § 5, reprintedin Walterseheid 1998, supranote 39, at App. VIII.
41Walterseheid 1998, supra note 39, at 228.
42 Patent Act of 1836, § 14, reprinted in Walterseheid 1998, supra note 39, at App. XV
(emphasis added).
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establishedby the evidence. The court exercises this power principally in
cases of wanton infringement, or where the defendant has compelled the
43
plaintiff to resort to needless and expensive litigation.
In checking a number of the cases from the 1800s that are cited by Robinson, I did
not find any in which the jury was specifically asked to determine if infringement
was wanton or willful. Willfulness simply was not part of the jury charge. Rather,
the willfulness determination seemed to be inextricably part of the judge's decision to
enhance or not enhance the amount of actual damages.
For example, in Schwarzel v. Holenshade44 the plaintiff was assignee of the
exclusive right to sell patented machines for separating grain in a certain five-county
region of Ohio. The defendant held the exclusive right to sell the patented machine
in six other counties. The lawsuit was filed after the defendant sold some infringing
machines to customers in the plaintiffs territory. The plaintiff presented evidence in
a jury trial that the defendant sold seven infringing machines for separating grain,
and that the plaintiffs lost profit on each sale was fifteen dollars. The jury returned
a verdict for one-hundred five dollars (the product of seven times fifteen). After the
jury verdict, the patentee made a motion to the court for treble damages, on the
ground that the infringement was "wanton and willful," which the court denied. The
court stated that "the only question for the court is, whether from these facts a case
is made for the exercise of the discretion of the court in ordering a judgement to be
entered for three times the amount of damages returned by the jury."45

The court

concluded that based on the text of 1836 Act, there were certainly cases in which
trebling might be appropriate, but this case was not one of them. "The facts did not
justify the jury in giving a verdict for vindictive or exemplary damages; nor do they
warrant the court in trebling the damages." 46 So we see in Schwarzel the court
drawing its own factual conclusions about the nature of the infringement and
whether it was wanton enough to justify trebling. This is consistent with the other
cases cited by Robinson from throughout the 1800s.
Lastly, nothing in the current text of the 1952 Patent Act mandates that juries
determine the question of willfulness. In fact, the language of 35 U.S.C. § 284
strongly supports the contrary position.
Although the statute provides that
"damages" may be found by a jury, the only actor with authority to "increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed" is the court. 47 Section 284
does not speak of "willfulness." The finding of facts concerning the culpability of the
accused infringer's conduct is better viewed as integrally part of the enhancement
determination, which the statute reserves exclusively for the court.
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44 21 F. Cas. 772 (S.D. Ohio 1866).
45 Id. at 773.
46

Id.

47 35 U.S.C. § 284 provides in part that "[w]hen the damages are not found by a jury, the court

shall assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed .. " 35 U.S.C. § 284
2 (2000).
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B. FunctionalConsiderations
In addition to the historical record, there are important functional and practical
considerations that support assigning the willfulness determination to the judge
48
rather than the jury. Empirical data compiled by Professor Kimberly Moore
suggest that under the current willfulness framework, there is a significant
difference in result depending upon the identity of the trier of fact, i.e., whether judge
or jury makes the finding of willfulness. In Professor Moore's data set of all patent
cases tried in the U.S. from 1983-2000, willfulness was decided in 657 cases.

49

Of

8

these 657 cases, willfulness was found in 6 .1% of the cases tried to a jury but in only
53.7% of bench trials. 50 This fourteen percent disparity suggests either that juries
are more easily swayed by "bad actor" portrayals of accused infringers or perhaps
simply that the standard for willfulness is amorphous enough to permit juries to be
swayed so frequently.
Of course one cannot fault the juries entirely for their propensity to find willful
infringement. Willfulness, like inequitable conduct, has become a standard charge in
almost every patent infringement lawsuit. In Professor Moore's data set of 1717
patent cases terminated in 1999-2000, willfulness was alleged in the originally filed
complaint in 92.3% of cases. 51 The "plague on the system" charge that has been
leveled against defendants' almost automatic assertions of inequitable conduct by
patentees seems equally applicable to patentees charging willfulness.
Professor Moore also suggests that in many cases, judges are refraining from
enhancing damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 as a means of checking juries that are
finding willfulness too often. 52 If judges have to manipulate the enhancement
decision in order to check juries on the finding of willfulness, are juries the
appropriate fact finder to begin with? Or is the legal framework fundamentally
flawed?
Another practical reason that willfulness should be removed from the jury is
that it may taint the jury's finding on the threshold question of liability. As patent
litigators Matthew Powers and Steven Carlson have pointed out, in cases where the
accused infringer has raised a substantial good faith defense, permitting a patentee
to paint an accused infringer as a "bad actor" with malicious intent to free-ride on the
patented invention is very likely to prejudice the jury's finding on the threshold
53
question of infringement liability.

Significant advantages flow from assigning the determination of willfulness
exclusively to the courts. For example, as Powers and Carlson also have suggested,
district courts could withhold determination of willfulness until after the Federal
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49 Id. at 11.
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See id. at 11 (reporting that among all patent cases tried from 1983-2000, judges awarded
penalties of enhanced damages and/or attorney fees in 92.2% of the cases where the judge found
willfulness but in only 58.9% of the cases where the jury found willfulness).
5 See Matthew D. Powers and Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution andImpact of the Doctrine of
Wilful Patent Infringement,51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 111 (2001) (citing Quantum Corp. v. Tandon
Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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Circuit had blessed a jury's determination of liability and actual damages. 54
Consistent with the procedure for seeking attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, the
patent owner who prevailed on appeal of the liability and actual damages issues
could move, post-appeal, for enhanced damages based on willfulness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284. 55 A losing infringer would thus have a strong incentive to settle the case
before the district court could potentially enhance damages. 56 Moreover, discovery on
willfulness could be postponed until after the appeal, and the waiver problems
currently associated with production of an opinion of counsel by the accused infringer
57
would be removed from the original trial.

The proposal that courts, not juries, exclusively determine the fact of willfulness
as integral to the damages enhancement determination admittedly adds to the
current and significant weight of responsibilities carried by U.S. district judges in
patent cases. The combined judicial responsibilities of determining willfulness (as
proposed herein), in addition to the district courts' existing claim interpretation
responsibilities imposed by Markman and the prosecution history estoppel
responsibilities that follow from Festo,58 strongly militate for specialized patent trial

courts. A number of commentators have called for the creation in the U.S. of
specialized patent trial courts, in addition to the specialized appellate review already
provided by the Federal Circuit. 59 Such patent-specialized trial courts already exist

60
in several foreign countries.
U.S. patent policy makers would do well to revisit patent specialization at the
trial level, in order to give the federal district courts the time and resources they
deserve to deal with these complex issues in a meaningful way. Specialization at the
trial level was considered but rejected in favor of forming the Federal Circuit in
1982.61 But 22 years later, the U.S. patent litigation landscape looks fundamentally
different, both in terms of dramatic changes in substantive and procedural law and
in the much greater number of patent cases being filed each year. 62 A reevaluation of
proposals to create specialized patent trial courts is in order.

5 Id.
55 Id.
56

Id.

57Id.
58 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

(en bane) (determining that rebuttal of presumption of prosecution history estoppel is a question of
law for the court, not the jury, to decide).

59 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17
John B. Pegram, Should There Be a US. Trial Court With a
Specializationin PatentLitigation?, 82 J. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 766 (2000).
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877 (2002);

60See Pegram, supra note 59, at 773-80 (discussing specialized patent adjudication in England
and Japan and proposals for the creation of a "Community IP Court" in Europe).
61 See James Davis, Formation of the Federal Circuit, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 547, 547 (2001)
(identifying specialized patent trial courts as one of several approaches that were considered in
response to perceived instability problems with patent law, but noting that '[i]n the end, the merger
of the CCPA [Court of Customs and Patent Appeals] and Court of Claims turned out to be the only
possible solution politically").
62 See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, JudicialFacts and Figures, Table 2.2 ("Civil
Cases Filed by Nature of Suit"), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/
table2.02.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2004) (reporting that for fiscal year 1988, 1,226 patent cases were
filed in the U.S. district courts and that this number had risen to 2,700 by fiscal year 2002,
representing a 12 0% increase).

